ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The annual rate of growth of the power distribution network in the UK has decreased from around 10% before 1970 to just over 1% in recent years. This decrease, as well as new environmental, financial and regulatory pressures, has tended to create an environment where the need for and benefit arising from capital investment in the network are subjected to increased scrutiny.
Where in the past low-risk network configurations with high levels of built-in redundancy were preferred, today's asset management emphasis on delivering good value for money for electricity consumers has meant that it is appropriate to re-examine the balance between system reliability and capital expenditure.
There are drivers that are tending to increase the level of risk to the continuity of supply to customers (or Network Risk). These drivers include:
• Increasing utilisation of distribution networks;
• Increasing frequency of severe weather conditions;
• Increasing levels of both accidental and malicious damage, leading to network vulnerability; • Ageing of the asset base;
• Loss of engineering experience and expertise as older engineers retire. Set against these drivers is increasing expectations from customers and increasing regulatory focus on understanding and managing levels of network risk.
Concern about these issues has led to the creation of a joint research project between CE Electric UK, who are responsible for electricity distribution over a large area of northern England, and the School of Engineering at Durham University. This research seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the risk inherent in existing distribution networks, to develop a means of quantifying this risk, and to develop methodologies to model and analyse that risk.
In the longer term, a number of additional factors could be expected to impact on levels of network risk, including:
• Increased awareness of global warming leading to a tighter regulatory environment and to increased demands on the system; • Increased levels of connected generation, leading to a requirement to proactively manage power flows and voltages across the network; • Possible national energy supply shortages if aged generators are not replaced as quickly as they are retired; • The development of active network management, using sophisticated control technology, including deployment of demand side management; • Possible further unbundling and restructuring of the industry e.g. introducing further competition and other system operators such as Energy Services Companies. The project also seeks to quantify and model these longer term, more uncertain factors.
Research Background
Many investigative studies concentrate on optimizing the performance of feeders operating at medium voltages such as 11 kV [1] [2] [3] . This may be because most of the consumer unavailability occurs at these voltage levels, and because such feeders tend to be similar to one another and can therefore be represented generically. At voltages, in the 33 kV to 132 kV range, there tends to be rather less research material, and it is with networks operating at these higher voltage levels that the present study is mainly concerned.
The growth of an asset management approach has also focussed attitudes. Instead of being risk-averse, utilities increasingly identify prudent performance targets and actively manage risk [4] . With this focussed outlook, asset management is a complex process. Norgard et. al. list 31 distinct challenges to distribution utilities, grouped into six categories: legal, organizational, technical, environmental, reputation and societal. They state that the electricity distribution industry increasingly regards the concept of risk assessment as an important tool in distribution network asset management [5] .
For any network risk studies, a range of approaches are available and the most appropriate must be chosen. Brown and Hanson, in a seminal paper, compare 'four common methodologies used for distribution reliability assessment' [6] . Standard textbooks describe all four in detail, and apply them to power systems [7] . The choice of methodology for the present research was described in detail in a previous paper by the present authors [8] . The decision was made to use Analytical Simulation, supplemented where appropriate by the other three approaches (Network Modelling, Markov Modelling, and Monte-Carlo Simulation). The approach was illustrated in that paper by three different case studies taken from within the CE Electric UK network. Figure 1 shows the network around a nodal point (NP), which is a 132kV switching station whose aged assets are due for replacement. The network operates as a closed ring and whilst load D (at Substation D) is clearly supplied via the nodal point, network studies indicate that a proportion of load B is also supplied via the nodal point under normal operating conditions. Load A, load C and the remainder of load B are supplied directly from Grid Supply Point (GSP). Double circuits are used throughout this part of the network. Dotted lines indicate underground cable, solid lines indicate overhead lines, and X indicates a circuit breaker. The replacement of the assets at the nodal point is a major construction project, expected to last over two summer seasons (when UK demand is lowest), and to cost around £8M. During construction works, principally when transferring circuits from the old equipment to the new, one or more circuits will be out of service, and consequently the risk to customer supplies during these periods will increase.
KV CASE STUDY

Figure 1 -Case Study Network Configuration
There are a number of options for carrying out the project, such as whether to rebuild in situ or on an adjacent green field site. The in situ solution costs less, but could involve longer circuit outages and consequently a greater risk.
The rebuilt NP would have an expected lifetime of at least 40 years, and this raises questions as to whether the straightforward replacement of the existing configuration is the best solution to those challenges to network reliability that are likely to arise over the next 40 years. One option concerns a separate 132 kV double circuit, not shown in Figure 1 , which feeds two other loads from a different GSP, but which passes within a few metres of the NP. It would be relatively straightforward to connect this double circuit into the NP by the installation of additional switchgear, but the cost of doing so and the customer benefits delivered need to be understood. The additional interconnection would give an extra supply option for all six loads, thereby increasing network flexibility and possibly overall reliability, and has been included as part of the construction project.
Conversely, it could be possible to eliminate NP from the network altogether. Figure 2 shows a possible reconfiguration which does this. This would cost significantly less than the replacement of NP, and leave a simpler network, although one with rather fewer operational options and possibly with an increased level of risk.
However, the biggest issue in rebuilding for the next 40 years concerns challenges which can perhaps only be qualitatively perceived at present. These challenges could include global warming, greater levels of distributed and renewable generation, demand side management, smart grids, active network management, and restructuring of the industry. Any solution adopted for the rebuilding or replacement of NP must at least attempt to address some or all of these challenges.
ANALYSIS OF SHORT-TERM RISK
The level of network risk before, during and after the construction period can be quantified in expected £K per year, made up of three distinct elements:
1. The financial penalty imposed by the regulator if the number of customer interruptions (CI) exceeds a target level. (There is a corresponding reward if the number is below target) 2. A similar financial penalty or reward based on outage duration, the number of customer minutes lost (CML). 3. The additional cost of unplanned repairs to assets as a consequence of circuit failure compared to undertaking repairs as part of a planned programmed (whether or not such failures result in a loss of customer supplied). .
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Figure 2 -Alternative configuration without NP
A model was constructed incorporating probabilities of component failure, and likely consequences of such failure, for various scenarios. The base run of this model evaluated the network risk inherent in the present configuration, across all six loads. The expected annual risk came to £67k for CI, £63k for CML and £32k for repairs, a total of £162k. It is against these levels of risk that different construction and network configuration options should be assessed.
For example, the additional risk incurred due to circuit outages across the whole construction period is an expected £42k if construction takes place on a green field site. If, however, construction has to take place in situ, then the extended outage periods increases this risk by £66k, to £108k. This extra £66k of risk can be compared with the additional capital cost of constructing on a green field site. The risk reduction once new equipment is installed proved harder to assess, as the gas insulated switchgear (GIS) technology used is still fairly new at this voltage level, and so accurate expected failure rates are not known.
Additional Considerations
The alternative configuration shown in Figure 2 was also evaluated using this short-term risk methodology. The expected annual network risk increases by £45k over the base run, to £207k. This extra annual cost can be compared with the one-off capital cost of around £8M to rebuild the NP. On this basis, the alternative configuration appears to be a cost-effective option. However, there are other considerations to be taken into account. Before evaluating network risk, it is necessary to investigate power flows within the revised configuration. This configuration was modelled using the DINIS system, and a network analysis was carried out to compute steady-state power flows and voltage levels throughout the revised network. This modelling confirmed that, under all (n-1) outage scenarios (which in the UK require immediate restoration of supply for this size of demand) the revised network was not overloaded, and that voltage levels remained within statutory limits.
A second consideration concerns the size of protection zones resulting from this configuration. Figure 2 shows that one circuit creates a protection zone with switching on 4 separate sites. This is the upper limit permitted by the UK grid code for 132kV circuits, and is above the upper limit of 3 separate sites currently recommended at CE Electric UK.
A third consideration is the use of average values for model input parameters such as failure rates and restoration times, which produces the average or expected risk cost per year over a number of years. However, CE Electric UK are also concerned about their liability, an indication of the possible risk cost in a particularly bad year, such as the worst in 10 years or even in 100 years. To assess the magnitude of the liability, Monte Carlo Simulation was used, using the Risk Solver package [9] .
In this methodology, the frequency and severity of circuit failures are not fixed at average values, but are sampled from a representative probability distribution. Restoration times are likewise sampled from an underlying distribution. A large number of possible years (50000 was the number set in the model) were evaluated and ranked. The 90 th percentile of this output then gives the estimated network risk incurred by configuring the network without NP in the worst year in 10 years. This came to £302k (as against £207k for the average year). The worst year in 100 years (the 99 th percentile) gave a risk of £439k. These are the figures that CE Electric UK management would consider in deciding whether the additional liability was acceptable when set against possible capital expenditure savings.
ANALYSIS OF LONG-TERM RISK
It can be seen that the methodology for evaluating shortterm risk in expected annual £k is a versatile and powerful risk assessment tool, particularly when supported by power flow analysis and operational considerations and when extended by Monte Carlo Simulation to encompass variability and liability. However the modelling does require accurate input data such as failure rates. These are available for present and foreseeable future risk. But any asset replacement needs to perform a valuable network function for at least 40 years to mitigate risks that could well be quite different to those presently experienced. A methodology is required to address these future risks. To do this, a separate modelling technique was devised, to measure the robustness or resilience of the network to cater for a number of possible future scenarios. For initial trial of this technique, a list of 10 such scenarios was used, as shown in Table 1 . Each of the six loads was assessed under each of the 10 future scenarios, and scored on a scale from 0 (no vulnerability) to 10 (extremely vulnerable).
Scenario Description
1
Loss of two incoming circuits on one 132 kV tower 2
Loss of two incoming circuits due to cable damage 3
Loss of some or all busbars due to fire or flood 4
Restricted supply from normal GSP (say to 50%) 5
Increased failure rates of ageing assets 6
Political sensitivity of customers to loss of supply 7
Location: vulnerability to weather or damage 8
Amount and intermittency of connected generation 9
Amount and complexity of active network mgt. 10
Sensitivity to a tighter regulatory environment (on a score of 1 to 10), or whether some should carry a greater weighting than others, and • What the likely level of vulnerability would be, for each load under each scenario The provisional results are, nonetheless, interesting. As a base run, the existing network was evaluated for future robustness. For each load, the 10 vulnerability scores were summed to give a score out of 100. The range was from 37 (for Load A, the most robust and least vulnerable) up to 52 for load C (the least robust), giving an average vulnerability score of 45 out of 100.
With the less robust configuration of Figure 2 , these scores increase to give a range from 51 (Load A) to 66 (Load D), with an average of 56 out of 100. This increase in vulnerability could be used by CE Electric UK management to assess whether the long term risk incurred by simplifying the network was acceptable. This would require familiarity with using the vulnerability index, and confidence in its reliability as an index of risk.
The vulnerability index could also be used to assess other possible configurations. For example, a network without NP, but with four circuits instead of two at Load B and an additional busbar on the 132 kV side of Load B, would be a possible intermediate solution, in terms both of capital cost and of network risk. Scoring it by this methodology gives an average vulnerability index of 52, an intermediate value.
CONCLUSIONS
The level of risk inherent in electricity distribution networks is perceived to be increasing in the short term and still more in the long term. Several investment options are available to mitigate that risk, including renewal or reinforcement of assets, reconfiguration of the network, and more radical operating solutions including various kinds of active network management. Choosing the most cost effective of these options is the responsibility of managers, who need appropriate ways of measuring and ranking network risk in order to make informed decisions. This paper has described and illustrated by case study two such measurements, a short-term one using expected annual £k, and a longer term one using a vulnerability index.
